Fawning Media will Ignore Obama’s Pakistan Disaster

The Obama Administration continues to say all the “correct” things about Pakistan and its fight against the Taliban.  Yet, knowledgeable observers in South Asia give the country no more than twelve months to stave off the terror group’s inevitable takeover of that nuclear Islamic Republic.  In a New York Times piece in early April, David Kilcullen, former adviser to United States military commander General David Petraeus, predicted Pakistan’s fall to the Taliban “within six months.” Shortly afterwards, his former boss agreed that the current Taliban “insurgency” could “take down” Pakistan.  Even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted later that month, “I think that the Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.”

Yet, the Administration continues to push its program of propping up the ineffective Pakistani government courtesy of US taxpayers.

The US should have two priorities for Pakistan:  secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal; and lead an international effort to protect the country’s remaining minority populations on both sides of the Indo-Pak border, as they have been fleeing Taliban persecution in droves at least since February.  The administration seems committed to doing neither.  Thus, when Pakistan, along with its nukes and remaining minorities, falls to the Taliban; we can expect it to say that it tried everything it could, but that things were too far gone given the policies of its predecessor.  And when it does, expect the media to fall behind it lock step, even though the same reporters gleefully blamed President George W. Bush for 9/11 and refused even to entertain the notion that the policies of the previous, Clinton, administration were the primary cause. Read more

The Limits of Terrorism

Does terrorism work, meaning, does it achieve its perpetrators’ objectives?

With terror attacks having become a routine and nearly daily occurrence, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the conventional wisdom holds that terrorism works very well. For example, the late Ehud Sprinzak of the Hebrew University ascribed the prevalence of suicide terrorism to its “gruesome effectiveness.” Robert Pape of the University of Chicago argues that suicide terrorism is growing “because terrorists have learned that it pays.” Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz titled one of his books Why Terrorism Works.

But Max Abrahms, a fellow at Stanford University, disputes this conclusion, noting that they focus narrowly on the well-known but rare terrorist victories – while ignoring the much broader, if more obscure, pattern of terrorism’s failures. To remedy this deficiency, Abrahms took a close look at each of the 28 terrorist groups so designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001 and tallied how many of them achieved its objectives.

His study, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” finds that those 28 groups had 42 different political goals and that they achieved only 3 of those goals, for a measly 7 percent success rate. Those three victories would be: (1) Hezbollah’s success at expelling the multinational peacekeepers from Lebanon in 1984, (2) Hezbollah’s success at driving Israeli forces out of Lebanon in 1985 and 2000, and (3) the Tamil Tiger’s partial success at winning control over areas of Sri Lanka after 1990.

That’s it. The other 26 groups, from the Abu Nidal Organization and Al-Qaeda and Hamas to Aum Shinriko and Kach and the Shining Path, occasionally achieved limited success but mostly failed completely. Abrahms draws three policy implications from the data.

Guerrilla groups that mainly attack military targets succeed more often than terrorist groups that mainly attack civilian targets. (Terrorists got lucky in the Madrid attack of 2004.)
Terrorists find it “extremely difficult to transform or annihilate a country’s political system”; those with limited objectives (such as acquiring territory) do better than those with maximalist objectives (such as seeking regime change).
Not only is terrorism “an ineffective instrument of coercion, but … its poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself.” This lack of success should “ultimately dissuade potential jihadists” from blowing up civilians.
This final implication, of frequent failure leading to demoralization, suggests an eventual reduction of terrorism in favor of less violent tactics. Indeed, signs of change are already apparent.

 

 
At the elite level, for example the former jihad theorist, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl), now denounces violence: “We are prohibited from committing aggression,” he writes, “even if the enemies of Islam do that.”

On the popular level, the Pew Research Center’s 2005 Global Attitudes Project found that “support for suicide bombings and other terrorist acts has fallen in most Muslim-majority nations surveyed” and “so too has confidence in Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.” Likewise, a 2007 Program on International Policy Attitudes study found that “Large majorities in all countries oppose attacks against civilians for political purposes and see them as contrary to Islam. … Most respondents … believe that politically-motivated attacks on civilians, such as bombings or assassinations, cannot be justified.”

On the practical level, terrorist groups are evolving. Several of them – specifically in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria – have dropped violence and now work within the political system. Others have taken on non-violent functions – Hezbollah delivers medical services and Hamas won an election. If Ayatollah Khomeini and Osama bin Laden represent Islamism’s first iteration, Hezbollah and Hamas represent a transitional stage, and Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan, arguably the world’s most influential Islamist, shows the benefits of going legitimate.

But if going the political route works so well, why does Islamist violence continue and even expand? Because they are not always practical. Rita Katz of the SITE Intelligence Group explains: “Engaged in a divine struggle, jihadists measure success not by tangible victories in this life but by God’s eternal benediction and by rewards received in the hereafter.”

In the long term, however, Islamists will likely recognize the limits of violence and increasingly pursue their repugnant goals through legitimate ways. Radical Islam’s best chance to defeat us lies not in bombings and beheadings but in classrooms, law courts, computer games, television studios, and electoral campaigns.

We are on notice.

The Strategic Debate Over Afghanistan

By George Friedman

After U.S. airstrikes killed scores of civilians in western Afghanistan this past week, White House National Security Adviser Gen. James L. Jones said the United States would continue with the airstrikes and would not tie the hands of U.S. generals fighting in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus has cautioned against using tactics that undermine strategic U.S. goals in Afghanistan — raising the question of what exactly are the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. A debate inside the U.S. camp has emerged over this very question, the outcome of which is likely to determine the future of the region.

On one side are President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and a substantial amount of the U.S. Army leadership. On the other side are Petraeus — the architect of U.S. strategy in Iraq after 2006 — and his staff and supporters. An Army general — even one with four stars — is unlikely to overcome a president and a defense secretary; even the five-star Gen. Douglas MacArthur couldn’t pull that off. But the Afghan debate is important, and it provides us with a sense of future U.S. strategy in the region. Read more

China: Beijing Strengthens its Claims in the South China Sea

Summary

In response to evolving economic conditions, growing international involvement and anticipated legal battles over control of several contested island groups and reefs in the South China Sea, Beijing has established a Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs, enhanced the capabilities and number of patrols by the Fisheries Administration Bureau and planned shifts in the disposition of its naval forces. China’s more aggressive attempts to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea will lead to increased friction with its neighbors and the United States — something that could easily escalate if there are miscalculations or accidents at sea. Read more

Pakistan: Nuclear Security and the U.S. Strategy for Southwest Asia

Analysis

As the Pakistani Taliban spread their insurgency beyond the northwestern Pashtun areas and into the country’s core — the government is trying to contain them in an area some 100 miles from Islamabad — concerns are being raised about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. These concerns are not unfounded. Although security forces are beginning to wage a more concerted campaign against the insurgents, the Pakistani state continues to be weakened by mounting political, economic and security issues. Indeed, it is unclear to what extent the government can effectively counter the Taliban’s advance. Read more

New Government’s Iran dilemma

General Elections in India are in last leg and next week people’s verdict will be wide open. In wake of an anticipated fractured verdict the deadlock for the formation of new government could extend for few weeks but it seems quite clear that it would be either Congress led government or BJP led government at the centre. South Asia forum has specific information that two national parties has  agreed upon to this point that regional satraps would not be allowed to lead the coalition and they will be forced to support either of one in national parties. Read more

Nepal: A Political Crisis and Indo-Chinese Tensions

Summary

Nepalese Prime Minister Prachanda resigned on May 4 in protest of the president’s decision to block the Maoist leadership from sacking Nepal’s army chief. While the political disarray in Nepal threatens to break the government apart, it also has stirred a long-standing rivalry between India and China over the Himalayan country.

Analysis

Nepal’s Maoist Prime Minister Prachanda resigned May 4 in protest of the Nepalese president’s decision to block the elected Maoist government from firing the country’s army chief. The Nepalese government is now in danger of collapsing as India scrambles to form a coherent policy toward Kathmandu to counter China’s growing influence in the Himalayan country. The Maoist leadership, meanwhile, will draw on Indo-Chinese competition over Kathmandu in an attempt secure its political demands. Read more

The Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Cornered Tiger Is Still Deadly

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake told parliament May 5 that he believes Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is among the large group of Tiger militants trapped in a 4-square kilometer coastline area near Mullaitivu. The area around Mullaitivu has been the final focal point of a recent larger government military offensive aimed at restoring government control of northeast Sri Lanka and crushing the South Asian country’s separatist rebels, who have controlled large parts of the region for the past several years. Read more

China is a threat to global good

As the world watches without being able to bring about a ceasefire, a humanitarian crisis is underway in Sri Lanka with nearly 170,000 civilians displaced and 50,000 trapped in the war zone. It has become common for rampaging armed forces and also those in cahoots with terrorists the world is battling with, despots and dictators to cock a snook at the UN. Much of the cockiness lies in the covert moral and logistic support lent by China, hungry for resources for widening its reach to get a major slice of business in the troubled regions and make its presence felt.

The Sri Lankan offensive against the LTTE is not faulted as the terrorist organization has used all possible means of violence over the years to foment terror in this beautiful island resembling a tear drop in the Indian Ocean. Lots of blood sweat and tears have flowed for the fight for a separate Tamil homeland in protest for the marginalization of the Sri Lankan Tamils. But the process of terror was always condemnable and has encouraged later day terror groups like the al Qaeda to emulate their suicide attack techniques. Read more