obama promised troop withdrawl from Afghanistan this year

January 26, 2011 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

obama1US President Barack Obama said Tuesday night that tough fighting lies ahead in Afghanistan but renewed his commitment to begin withdrawing US troops this year.
In his prime time State of the Union address to Congress, Obama said the troop buildup he ordered has stripped the Taliban of strongholds in Afghanistan. He said the United States and coalition partners will work to prevent the militants from “re-establishing a stranglehold” on the country and will keep pressure on terrorist network al-Qaeda.
International forces will continue the transition to an Afghan lead in providing security and stability, and US forces will begin drawing down in July, Obama said. Prevailing in Afghanistan is among Obama’s top foreign priorities.
“There will be tough fighting ahead, and the Afghan government will need to deliver better governance,” Obama said. “But we are strengthening the capacity of the Afghan people and building an enduring partnership with them.”More

Pakistan has something to cheer from Obama as he admits Qaeda leadership is under pressure in Pak

January 26, 2011 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

obama1President Barack Obama Wednesday said al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to plan attack against the United States even as he said that Osama bin Laden-led outfit is under pressure in Pakistan.
“As we speak, al Qaeda and their affiliates continue to plan attacks against us. Thanks to our intelligence and law enforcement professionals, we are disrupting plots and securing our cities and skies,” Obama said in his State of the Union Address before a joint session of the US Congress.More

Obama insists NKorea give up nuclear

January 26, 2011 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

south korea protest1President Barack Obama told North Korea to stick to its commitment to abandon atomic weapons, throwing his support behind ally South Korea ahead of talks to try to calm tension on the divided peninsula.
Seoul announced on Wednesday that it would hold its first meeting with North Korean officials since a deadly artillery attack on an island in the South in November.
“On the Korean peninsula, we stand with our ally South Korea, and insist that North Korea keeps its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons,” Obama said in his State of the Union address on Tuesday night.
The two Koreas will meet at the border truce village of Panmunjom on February 11 for preliminary military talks to discuss last year’s two deadly attacks against the South’s Cheonan warship and the island of Yeonpyeong.
Seoul has held out the prospect of high-level military talks, possibly at ministerial level, if Pyongyang accepts responsibility for the attacks and agrees not to carry out such provocations again.
North Korea denies it had anything to do with the sinking of the Cheonan and says the South provoked its artillery attack.
“To establish peace on the Korean peninsula and see true development of North-South relations, the North must accept these proposals,” a South Korean unification ministry spokesman told a news briefing.
The South also wants separate bilateral talks with the North to ascertain its sincerity about denuclearisation, an effort that comes as the Pyongyang urges regional powers to resume aid-for-disarmament negotiations — so-called six-party talks — it walked out of two years ago.

UN Atomic Watchdog Rejects Resolution Against Israel

September 28, 2010 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

un atm omic bodyThe UN atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), rejected Friday an Arab-backed resolution against Israel. The resolution urging Israel to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was rejected with 51 votes against, 46 votes in favor, and 23 abstentions. Washington had flown in President Obama’s top nuclear advisor, Gary Samore, to try to persuade Arab nations to drop their plans. In 2009 the same resolution was adopted 49-45. A number of states that voted in favor last year, such as Singapore and Thailand, chose to abstain this year. Earlier this week, Israel’s nuclear chief Shaul Horev reiterated Israel’s stance that acceding to the NPT would run against its national interests. (AFP)more

Israel’s Muslims reach out: strategy, desperation or appeasement?

September 27, 2010 by Amitabh Tripathi  
Filed under Amitabh Tripathi, SAF blog

m ark sofer ajmerIn last month’s two things happen which could be interprerated as strange things to some extent. Ambassador of Israel to India Mark Sofer visited an Islamic shrine in Ajmer shrine of a sufi chisti and there he was greeted and warmly welcomed by local Muslim worshippers and encouraged with his warm welcome ambassador told the audience how Jews and Muslims are very much similar in their various traditions and they are twin sisters in some way or the other. This statement was marked with greater caution among others not only among Non-muslims but even larger part of Urdu news papers did not share the feelings of Mark Sofer as it may have anticipated by him. Usually Urdu press is always filled with medieval conspiracy theories for Jews and it was not less than shocking for them to witness an Israel diplomat visiting Islamic shrine and igniting the debate of some religious similarities between them. On the other hand other Non-Muslims in India, who don’t care much about Arab-Israel politics more than having a perception about it imposed by media outlets, were neither curious nor disappointed. But being a critique of Middle Eastern politics and political observer I thought it my duty to decipher the reasons and repercussions of this gesture. Read more

Obama to UN: “The Slaughter of Innocent Israelis Is Not Resistance – It’s Injustice”

September 26, 2010 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

attack on israel1President Obama told the UN General Assembly on Thursday: “Israel’s settlement moratorium has made a difference on the ground and improved the atmosphere for talks. And our position on this issue is well known. We believe that the moratorium should be extended. We also believe that talks should press on until completed.” Read more

US mulling to troop expansion in Pakistan: NYT

May 7, 2010 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

us pak1The Obama administration has intensified its debate about expanding America’s military presence in Pakistan, with some officials making the case to increase the number of Special Operations troops working with Pakistani forces in the country’s western mountains, The New York Times reported Friday.
some inside the administration believe that the C.I.A. programme of killing militants from the air is insufficient for preventing attacks on the West, and that an expanded training mission might raise confidence in Pakistan’s military enough to launch an offensive in the militant sanctuary of North Waziristan, in the tribal areas.
“There is a growing sense that there will need to be more of a boots on the ground strategy,” an unnamed Obama administration official was quoted as saying.
Officials, who requested anonymity to discuss strategy surrounding a programme that is technically secret, emphasized that any new troops in Pakistan would serve as advisers and trainers, not as combat forces…..

Read More

Obama’s Move: Iran and Afghanistan

October 4, 2009 by SAF Desk  
Filed under News at a glance

barack oabam 2By George Friedman
During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, now-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that like all U.S. presidents, Barack Obama would face a foreign policy test early in his presidency if elected. That test is now here.

His test comprises two apparently distinct challenges, one in Afghanistan and one in Iran. While different problems, they have three elements in common. First, they involve the question of his administration’s overarching strategy in the Islamic world. Second, the problems are approaching decision points (and making no decision represents a decision here). And third, they are playing out very differently than Obama expected during the 2008 campaign.

During the campaign, Obama portrayed the Iraq war as a massive mistake diverting the United States from Afghanistan, the true center of the “war on terror.” He accordingly promised to shift the focus away from Iraq and back to Afghanistan. Obama’s views on Iran were more amorphous. He supported the doctrine that Iran should not be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, while at the same time asserted that engaging Iran was both possible and desirable. Embedded in the famous argument over whether offering talks without preconditions was appropriate (something now-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attacked him for during the Democratic primary) was the idea that the problem with Iran stemmed from Washington’s refusal to engage in talks with Tehran.

We are never impressed with campaign positions, or with the failure of the victorious candidate to live up to them. That’s the way American politics work. But in this case, these promises have created a dual crisis that Obama must make decisions about now.

Iran

Back in April, in the midst of the financial crisis, Obama reached an agreement at the G-8 meeting that the Iranians would have until Sept. 24 and the G-20 meeting to engage in meaningful talks with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1) or face intensely increased sanctions. His administration was quite new at the time, so the amount of thought behind this remains unclear. On one level, the financial crisis was so intense and September so far away that Obama and his team probably saw this as a means to delay a secondary matter while more important fires were flaring up.

But there was more operating than that. Obama intended to try to bridge the gap between the Islamic world and the United States between April and September. In his speech to the Islamic world from Cairo, he planned to show a desire not only to find common ground, but also to acknowledge shortcomings in U.S. policy in the region. With the appointment of special envoys George Mitchell (for Israel and the Palestinian territories) and Richard Holbrooke (for Pakistan and Afghanistan), Obama sought to build on his opening to the Islamic world with intense diplomatic activity designed to reshape regional relationships.

It can be argued that the Islamic masses responded positively to Obama’s opening — it has been asserted to be so and we will accept this — but the diplomatic mission did not solve the core problem. Mitchell could not get the Israelis to move on the settlement issue, and while Holbrooke appears to have made some headway on increasing Pakistan’s aggressiveness toward the Taliban, no fundamental shift has occurred in the Afghan war.

Most important, no major shift has occurred in Iran’s attitude toward the United States and the P-5+1 negotiating group. In spite of Obama’s Persian New Year address to Iran, the Iranians did not change their attitude toward the United States. The unrest following Iran’s contested June presidential election actually hardened the Iranian position. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained president with the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while the so-called moderates seemed powerless to influence their position. Perceptions that the West supported the demonstrations have strengthened Ahmadinejad’s hand further, allowing him to paint his critics as pro-Western and himself as an Iranian nationalist.

But with September drawing to a close, talks have still not begun. Instead, they will begin Oct. 1. And last week, the Iranians chose to announce that not only will they continue work on their nuclear program (which they claim is not for military purposes), they have a second, hardened uranium enrichment facility near Qom. After that announcement, Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a press conference saying they have known about the tunnel for several months, and warned of stern consequences.

This, of course, raises the question of what consequences. Obama has three choices in this regard.

First, he can impose crippling sanctions against Iran. But that is possible only if the Russians cooperate. Moscow has the rolling stock and reserves to supply all of Iran’s fuel needs if it so chooses, and Beijing can also remedy any Iranian fuel shortages. Both Russia and China have said they don’t want sanctions; without them on board, sanctions are meaningless.

Second, Obama can take military action against Iran, something easier politically and diplomatically for the United States to do itself rather than rely on Israel. By itself, Israel cannot achieve air superiority, suppress air defenses, attack the necessary number of sites and attempt to neutralize Iranian mine-laying and anti-ship capability all along the Persian Gulf. Moreover, if Israel struck on its own and Iran responded by mining the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would be drawn into at least a naval war with Iran — and probably would have to complete the Israeli airstrikes, too.

And third, Obama could choose to do nothing (or engage in sanctions that would be the equivalent of doing nothing). Washington could see future Iranian nuclear weapons as an acceptable risk. But the Israelis don’t, meaning they would likely trigger the second scenario. It is possible that the United States could try to compel Israel not to strike — though it’s not clear whether Israel would comply — something that would leave Obama publicly accepting Iran’s nuclear program.

And this, of course, would jeopardize Obama’s credibility. It is possible for the French or Germans to waffle on this issue; no one is looking to them for leadership. But for Obama simply to acquiesce to Iranian nuclear weapons, especially at this point, would have significant diplomatic and domestic political ramifications. Simply put, Obama would look weak — and that, of course, is why the Iranians announced the second nuclear site. They read Obama as weak, and they want to demonstrate their own resolve. That way, if the Russians were thinking of cooperating with the United States on sanctions, Moscow would be seen as backing the weak player against the strong one. The third option, doing nothing, therefore actually represents a significant action.

Afghanistan

In a way, the same issue is at stake in Afghanistan. Having labeled Afghanistan as critical — indeed, having campaigned on the platform that the Bush administration was fighting the wrong war — it would be difficult for Obama to back down in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has reported that without a new strategy and a substantial increase in troop numbers, failure in Afghanistan is likely.

The number of troops being discussed, 30,000-40,000, would bring total U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan to just above the number of troops the Soviet Union deployed there in its war (just under 120,000) — a war that ended in failure. The new strategy being advocated would be one in which the focus would not be on the defeat of the Taliban by force of arms, but the creation of havens for the Afghan people and protecting those havens from the Taliban.

A move to the defensive when time is on your side is not an unreasonable strategy. But it is not clear that time is on Western forces’ side. Increased offensives are not weakening the Taliban. But halting attacks and assuming that the Taliban will oblige the West by moving to the offensive, thereby opening itself to air and artillery strikes, probably is not going to happen. And while assuming that the country will effectively rise against the Taliban out of the protected zones the United States has created is interesting, it does not strike us as likely. The Taliban is fighting the long war because it has nowhere else to go. Its ability to maintain military and political cohesion following the 2001 invasion has been remarkable. And betting that the Pakistanis will be effective enough to break the Taliban’s supply lines is hardly the most prudent bet.

In short, Obama’s commander on the ground has told him the current Afghan strategy is failing. He has said that unless that strategy changes, more troops won’t help, and that a change of strategy will require substantially more troops. But when we look at the proposed strategy and the force levels, it is far from obvious that even that level of commitment will stand a chance of achieving meaningful results quickly enough before the forces of Washington’s NATO allies begin to withdraw and U.S. domestic resolve erodes further.

Obama has three choices in Afghanistan. He can continue to current strategy and force level, hoping to prolong failure long enough for some undefined force to intervene. He can follow McChrystal’s advice and bet on the new strategy. Or he can withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Once again, doing nothing — the first option — is doing something quite significant.

The Two Challenges Come Together

The two crises intermingle in this way: Every president is tested in foreign policy, sometimes by design and sometimes by circumstance. Frequently, this happens at the beginning of his term as a result of some problem left by his predecessor, a strategy adopted in the campaign or a deliberate action by an antagonist. How this happens isn’t important. What is important is that Obama’s test is here. Obama at least publicly approached the presidency as if many of the problems the United States faced were due to misunderstandings about or the thoughtlessness of the United States. Whether this was correct is less important than that it left Obama appearing eager to accommodate his adversaries rather than confront them.

No one has a clear idea of Obama’s threshold for action.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban takes the view that the British and Russians left, and that the Americans will leave, too. We strongly doubt that the force level proposed by McChrystal will be enough to change their minds. Moreover, U.S. forces are limited, with many still engaged in Iraq. In any case, it isn’t clear what force level would suffice to force the Taliban to negotiate or capitulate — and we strongly doubt that there is a level practical to contemplate.

In Iran, Ahmadinejad clearly perceives that challenging Obama is low-risk and high reward. If he can finally demonstrate that the United States is unwilling to take military action regardless of provocations, his own domestic situation improves dramatically, his relationship with the Russians deepens, and most important, his regional influence — and menace — surges. If Obama accepts Iranian nukes without serious sanctions or military actions, the American position in the Islamic world will decline dramatically. The Arab states in the region rely on the United States to protect them from Iran, so U.S. acquiescence in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons would reshape U.S. relations in the region far more than a hundred Cairo speeches.

There are four permutations Obama might choose in response to the dual crisis. He could attack Iran and increase forces in Afghanistan, but he might well wind up stuck in a long-term war in Afghanistan. He could avoid that long-term war by withdrawing from Afghanistan and also ignore Iran’s program, but that would leave many regimes reliant on the United States for defense against Iran in the lurch. He could increase forces in Afghanistan and ignore Iran — probably yielding the worst of all possible outcomes, namely, a long-term Afghan war and an Iran with a nuclear program if not nuclear weapons.

On pure logic, history or politics aside, the best course is to strike Iran and withdraw from Afghanistan. That would demonstrate will in the face of a significant challenge while perhaps reshaping Iran and certainly avoiding a drawn-out war in Afghanistan. Of course, it is easy for those who lack power and responsibility — and the need to govern — to provide logical choices. But the forces closing in on Obama are substantial, and there are many competing considerations in play.

Presidents eventually arrive at the point where something must be done, and where doing nothing is very much doing something. At this point, decisions can no longer be postponed, and each choice involves significant risk. Obama has reached that point, and significantly, in his case, he faces a double choice. And any decision he makes will reverberate

www.stratfor.com

Netanyahu’s Quiet Success

October 4, 2009 by Daniel Pipes  
Filed under Daniel Pipes, Guest column

netanyahu1Almost unnoticed, Binyamin Netanyahu won a major victory last week when Barack Obama backed down on a signature policy initiative. This about-face suggests that U.S.-Israel relations are no longer headed for the disaster I have been fearing.

 
Four months ago, the new U.S. administration unveiled a policy that suddenly placed great emphasis on stopping the growth in Israeli “settlements.” (A term I dislike but use here for brevity’s sake.) Surprisingly, American officials wanted to stop not just residential building for Israelis in the West Bank but also in eastern Jerusalem, a territory legally part of Israel for nearly thirty years.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the initiative on May 27, announcing that the president of the United States “wants to see a stop to settlements – not some settlements, not outposts, not natural growth exceptions,” adding for good measure, “And we intend to press that point.” On June 4, Obama weighed in: “The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. … It is time for these settlements to stop.” A day later, he reiterated that “settlements are an impediment to peace.” On June 17, Clinton repeated: “We want to see a stop to the settlements.” And so on, in a relentless beat.

Focusing on settlements had the inadvertent but predictable effect of instantly impeding diplomatic progress. A delighted Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority responded to U.S. demands on Israel by sitting back and declaring that “The Americans are the leaders of the world. … I will wait for Israel to freeze settlements.” Never mind that Abbas personally had negotiated with six Israeli prime ministers since 1992, each time without an offer to stop building settlements: why should he now demand less than Obama?

In Israel, Obama’s diktat prompted a massive popular swing away from him and toward Netanyahu. Further, Netanyahu’s offer of even temporary limitations on settlement growth in the West Bank prompted a rebellion within his Likud Party, led by the up-and-coming Danny Danon.
Poster showing Barack Obama in Arab headdress, seen in downtown Jerusalem on June 14, 2009.
 
The geniuses of the Obama administration eventually discerned that this double hardening of positions was dooming their naïve, hubristic plan to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict within two years. The One’s reconciliation with reality became public on Sept. 22 at a “summit” he sponsored with Abbas and Netanyahu (really, a glorified photo opportunity). Obama threw in the towel there, boasting that “we have made progress” toward settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and offering as one indication that Israelis “have discussed important steps to restrain settlement activity.”

Those eight words of muted praise for Netanyahu’s minimal concessions have major implications:

Settlements no longer dominate U.S.-Israel relations but have reverted back to their usual irritating but secondary role.

Abbas, who keeps insisting on a settlement freeze as though nothing has changed, suddenly finds himself the odd man out in the triangle.
The center-left faction of the Obama administration (which argues for working with Jerusalem), as my colleague Steven J. Rosen notes, has defeated the far-left faction (which wants to squeeze the Jewish state).
Ironically, Obama supporters have generally recognized his failure while critics have tended to miss it. A Washington Post editorial referred to the Obama administration’s “miscalculations” and Jonathan Freedland, a Guardian columnist, noted that “Obama’s friends worry that he has lost face in a region where face matters.”

In contrast, Obama critics focused on his announcing, just one day after the mock summit, that “America does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements” – a formulaic reiteration of long-established policy that in no way undoes the concession on settlements. Some of those I admire most missed the good news: John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, stated that Obama “put Israel on the chopping block,” while critics within the Likud Party accused Netanyahu of having “prematurely celebrated” an American policy shift. Not so. Policy winds can always change, but last week’s capitulation to reality has the hallmarks of a lasting course correction.

I have repeatedly expressed deep worries about Obama’s policy versus Israel, so when good news does occur (and this is the second time of late), it deserves recognition and celebration. Hats off to Bibi – may he have further successes in nudging U.S. policy onto the right track.

Next on the agenda: the Middle East’s central issue, namely, Iran’s nuclear buildup.

Buying the peace on higher cost

October 4, 2009 by Amitabh Tripathi  
Filed under SAF blog

barack oabam 2“Peace” has always been a beautiful and highly romanticized word humanity ever invented but no period of time in history passed without a war the more long period without war more devastating the war have been.  Since last one century word “peace” has been used as many times as now it has lost its meaning.  Modern European history which has been more or less interpret rated as history of the modern world is full of wars but students of history always hope for a peaceful world in their generation where there would be no war. The whole world looks in one direction and works for one aim that how permanent peace could be achieved but what is the reason that peace has always been a distant dream and not reality. The biggest reason which I see is very much different what others perceive and that reason is that over emphasis on peace is always a wrong goal to achieve because once you told others that you want to establish peace it implied to others that you are ready to achieve this goal at any cost. Once any individual, group or nation commits itself for peace onus goes on his side to establish peace at any cost and it gives breathing space for other rivals who are not interested in peace and they use this humanistic and romanticized view as their major weapon to intimidate and blackmail. Rather than peace word must have been used “Justice”. Justice is a phenomenon which is always relative to circumstances and self conscience. Read more

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